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Abstract: This paper considers the extent to which lexical acquisition is an exercise of an 
associationist ability, a general mind-reading ability or a specifically pragmatic ability. 
Particular attention is paid to the role played in word-learning by natural communicative 
phenomena—gaze direction, facial expression, tone of voice etc.—and to the question of 
how such behaviours might be accommodated within a pragmatic theory. As well as 
sketching some possible directions in which future research into the pragmatics of lexical 
acquisition might proceed I will also suggest, given recent research in relevance theoretic 
lexical pragmatics, that there are interesting parallels to be drawn between the processes 
at work in lexical acquisition and those at work in adult comprehension. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
This article has two aims. Firstly, I will sketch a framework within which we can 
explore how speakers provide clues to the intended meanings of their words to (a) 
young children acquiring the meanings of those words and (b) to adult (or child) 
interlocutors in communicative exchanges. The discussion involves, on the one hand, 
the human meta-psychological abilities so central to human communication—
mindreading or Theory of Mind (BARON-COHEN, 1995)—and, on the other, what I 
have elsewhere called ‗natural pragmatic‘ factors (WHARTON, 2003, 2009): the 
largely natural, non-verbal behaviours that inevitably accompany speech (e.g. tone of 
voice, facial expression) often known as ‗paralinguistic‘ phenomena (see WHARTON 
(forthcoming)). Secondly, I want to suggest that there are interesting parallels to be 
drawn between the processes at work in lexical acquisition and in adult comprehension: 
the words that are the title of this chapter (purloined from Grice himself) are eerily 
prophetic. 
In §2 I consider lexical acquisition in the light of two contrasting accounts: the 
first proposes that it is an exercise of an associationist ability; the second that a general 
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mindreading ability is involved. I present arguments in favour of the latter approach. 
Acquiring the meanings of words is largely a matter of working out, using (among other 
things) natural, non-verbal cues, what it is that people are referring to when they use 
them. In §3 I outline the theoretical framework adopted here, Relevance Theory 
(SPERBER; WILSON, 1986/1995, 2013), and show that since understanding utterances 
is as a matter of working out, using natural, non-verbal cues, the intentions behind them, 
the skills implicated in the way adult speakers use and understand them are the same 
skills that the second approach regards as crucial to the way children acquire the 
meanings of words. I then go on to consider the extent to which lexical acquisition 
might be an exercise of a pragmatic, as opposed to a general mindreading ability. In §4 I 
revisit earlier work of my own on the ‗showing-meaningNN‘ continuum (WILSON; 
WHARTON, 2006; WHARTON, 2009), which concerns itself with how natural, non-
verbal behaviours might be accommodated within a pragmatic theory. In the final 
section, I tie up the loose ends and propose some of the experimental implications 
adopting this framework might have as well as pointing to the parallels mentioned 
above. 
 
2. LEXICAL ACQUISITION AND MINDREADING 
 
The remarkable precocity children exhibit in their ability to learn words is well 
documented. According to Paul Bloom (2000), from the age of 12 months children 
acquire roughly ten new words a day. By the time they are 17 they will have attained a 
vocabulary of (on a conservative estimate) 60,000 words. In the absence of formal 
training, very young children ‗fast-map‘ words to meanings after only one or two 
exposures. Sometimes (in the case of many verbs, for example) not even the virtual 
absence of explicit naming by carers affects the child‘s ability to map new words onto 
actions. 
Central to Bloom‘s thesis is the claim that the child‘s sensitivity to the mental 
states of others plays a hugely important role in the process of lexical acquisition. In his 
2001 précis, Bloom (2001, p. 1094) elaborates: 
 
This proposal is an alternative to the view that word learning is the result of simple 
associative learning mechanisms, and it rejects as well the notion that children possess 
constraints, either innate or learned, that are specifically earmarked for word learning.  
           
       
The view that word learning is the result of associative learning mechanisms 
(BLOOM, L., 1994, p. 91) can be traced back to the Empiricist philosophers. Under this 
view, children form reliable associations between words and their meanings as a result 
of their sensitivity to statistical co-occurrences between what they see and what they 
hear. Bloom P.‘s alternative view argues that rather than just being sensitive to 
statistical correlations, children are sensitive to the referential intentions of speakers. 
Under this view, acquiring the meanings of words is largely as a matter of working out, 
using natural, non-verbal cues, what it is that people intend to refer to when they use 
them. He provides a whole range of convincing arguments to support a mind-reading 
model over an associationist one. 
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In the first place, the input the child receives is flawed in key regards. In some 
cultures, for example, parents and carers do not overtly name objects for children at all, 
yet word-learning proceeds at the same rate as in cultures where they do. Even in 
cultures where objects are overtly named by parents and carers, it is not always the case 
that a child will be looking at the object being named at the time they hear the word for 
that object. If word learning were simply a matter of associationist correlation, then on 
the basis of the input they receive we would expect the child to make many mapping 
errors in the course of word learning. The fast-mapping by children of words onto 
meanings is conspicuously error-free. 
Secondly, there is experimental evidence to favour a mindreading model over an 
associationist one. In a series of experiments, Baldwin (1991, 1993) effectively tested 
the two models. A child was given an object to play with while another, different, object 
was put into a bucket in front of the experimenter. Whilst the child was looking at the 
object she was playing with, the experimenter looked at her object and said a novel 
word—‗It‘s a modi‘. As Bloom (2000, p. 64) reports: 
 
This gives rise to a perfect Lockean correspondence between the new word and the object 
the baby was looking at. But 18-month-olds don‘t take modi as naming this object. Instead, 
they look at the experimenter and redirect their attention to what she is looking at… [T]hey 
assume that the word refers to the object the experimenter was looking at when she said the 
word—not the object that the child herself was looking at. 
 
Thirdly and finally, a mindreading model predicts that autistic individuals, who 
have impaired mind-reading abilities (LESLIE, 1987; HAPPÉ, 1994, BARON-COHEN, 
1995; SCHOLL; LESLIE, 1999) and have problems with pragmatic tasks generally, 
should show impaired word learning abilities. This is indeed the case. Baron-Cohen et 
al. 1997 replicated Baldwin‘s experiments with autistic children. As predicted by the 
mindreading model, these children assumed that the word modi referred to the object 
they, rather than the experimenter, were looking at. Autistic children do not monitor 
gaze direction (MUNDY et al, 1986) and the autistic child remains unaware that the 
experimenter is intending to refer to something other than the object the child herself is 
looking at.  
If mindreading is so centrally implicated in the way children learn words, then 
natural pragmatic factors will play a crucial role. Facial expression, gesture and gaze 
direction all provide an audience with vital clues as to the mental states of the others. 
Gaze direction is clearly one of the most important factors at play and in Baldwin‘s 
experiments, it is the most crucial piece of evidence that the child has as to the 
experimenter‘s intentions. Indeed, gaze direction is such a reliable indicator of aspects 
of another‘s intentions that it seems plausible to suggest that humans have an evolved, 
dedicated mechanism to monitor it. Baron-Cohen (1995) proposes that there is an ‗Eye 
Direction Detector‘, which might form a sub-module of the wider mind-reading module. 
Infants are disposed at a very early age to monitor eyes: Barrera and Maurer (1981) 
showed that two-month-old infants look significantly more at an adult‘s eyes than at 
other regions of their face; Papousek and Papousek (1979) suggest that six-month-old 
infants look up to three times longer at a face that is looking at them than at one that is 
looking away. 
 WHARTON, Tim. What words mean is a matter of what people mean by them. Linguagem em (Dis)curso – 
LemD, Tubarão, SC, v. 14, n. 3, p. 473-488, set./dez. 2014. 
P
ág
in
a4
7
6
 
Of course, at this very early stage in development, the child may just be ‗tuning-
in‘ to gaze direction, rather than attributing complex mental states (such as intentions) 
on the basis of it. Nonetheless, it appears that gaze direction quickly comes to be 
perceived as the main way adults indicate objects to children in the naming process. At 
a similarly early age, children follow adults‘ pointing gestures. By the age of one the 
child herself begins pointing, and monitors the gaze direction of the adult to check 
whether she has been successful in changing the focus of their attention. As well as the 
problems autistic individuals have tracking gaze direction, Sigman and Kasari (1995) 
show how even basic acts of showing such as pointing are problematic for autistic 
individuals, predicting precisely the results found in Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). 
At a later stage in her development, the child tracks not just gaze direction in word 
learning tasks, but also emotional expression as evidenced by facial expression and tone 
of voice. Tomasello and Akhtar (1994) report that children tracked not only the gaze but 
also the facial expression and tone of voice of experimenters while they searched for an 
object being named with a novel word (‗toma‘). When the experimenter had clearly 
found her goal, the child recognised this was so by interpreting her emotional 
expression, and understood the word accordingly. Interjections and other expressions of 
emotion also play a role. In Tomasello and Kruger (1992) an experimenter uttered an 
unfamiliar verb when telling the child what action she was about to perform. She then 
performed two actions, one accompanied by an expression such as ‗whoops‘, which 
indicated the action was accidental, and the other accompanied by a word indicating the 
action was intended. The child monitored the experimenter‘s reactions and took the verb 
to refer to the intended action, rather than the apparently accidental one. Since autistic 
individuals also have problems interpreting emotional states (HOBSON; OUSTON; 
LEE, 1988; MURIS; MEESTERS; MERCKELBACH; LOMME, 1995) the prediction 
would be that they would fail in experiments such as these. 
Bloom attributes the often somewhat bizarre use of words by autistic individuals 
to the fact that they only have associationist, rather than mind-reading strategies to 
resort to in lexical acquisition. Diesendruck (2004) suggests that those non-human 
animals that acquire limited vocabularies (such as trained bonobos) also do so by using 
associationist abilities. However, as Sperber (2004) notes in response to Diesendruck, it 
is not the case that autistic children have no interpretive abilities at all. An alternative 
possibility is that their interpretive abilities are limited by their failure to comprehend 
natural pragmatic cues such as gaze direction, tone of voice, facial expressions of 
emotion, etc., but that they are still performing recognisably pragmatic inferences in 
comprehension, and in particular in word learning. In the next section, I take up this 
proposal and consider the extent to which lexical acquisition might be an exercise of a 
pragmatic, as opposed to a general mind-reading ability. 
 
3. LEXICAL ACQUISITION AND RELEVANCE 
3.1 RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
Relevance theory (SPERBER; WILSON, 1986/1995) takes its lead from 
Chomskyan and Fodorian insights into language and mind, and combines a broadly 
Gricean intention-based pragmatics with aspects of cognitive science and modern 
psychological research to provide a cognitive-inferential pragmatic framework. 
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Relevance theory is built around two principles. The Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance makes a fundamental assumption about human cognition: the human 
cognitive system is geared to look out for relevant information, which will interact with 
existing mentally-represented information and bring about positive cognitive effects 
based on a combination of new and old information. Relevance itself is a property of 
inputs to cognitive processes, and is defined in terms of cognitive effects gained and 
processing effort expended: other things being equal, the more cognitive effects gained, 
and the less processing effort expended in gaining those effects, the greater the 
relevance of the input to the individual who processes it. 
 The human disposition to search for relevance is seen as an evolved 
consequence of the tendency toward greater efficiency in cognition (SPERBER; 
WILSON, 2002). It is, furthermore, a disposition that is routinely exploited in human 
communication. Since speakers know that listeners will pay attention only to stimuli 
that are relevant enough, in order to attract and hold an audience‘s attention, they should 
make their communicative stimuli appear at least relevant enough to be worth 
processing. More precisely, the Communicative Principle of Relevance claims that by 
overtly displaying an intention to inform—producing an utterance or other ostensive 
stimulus—a communicator creates a presumption that the stimulus is at least relevant 
enough to be worth processing, and moreover, the most relevant one compatible with 
her own abilities and preferences. This Communicative Principle motivates the 
following relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure—taken from Wilson and 
Sperber (2002, p. 13): 
 
Relevance theoretic comprehension procedure 
(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility 
(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied 
 
In the simplest case, an interpreter using the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure would follow a path of least effort in interpreting an utterance, and stop at the 
first interpretation that he found relevant enough. For more complex cases, see below. 
The inferential processes required by this account are unconscious and fast, and 
the comprehension procedure can be seen as a ‗fast and frugal heuristic‘ of the kind 
currently gaining much currency in cognitive science (GIGERENZER; TODD 1999; 
KAHNEMAN, 2011). In this respect, the relevance theoretic approach diverges from 
more traditional Gricean accounts of comprehension (see GRICE, 1989, p. 30-31)—
indeed, from philosophical characterisations generally—which rationally reconstruct the 
comprehension process in the form of conscious and reflective inferences about the 
mental states of others. This raises the question of the precise relationship between the 
mechanisms responsible for the latter kind of inferences, which (mature) individuals are 
certainly capable of, and those deployed in spontaneous comprehension. 
Sperber and Wilson (2002) present arguments to suggest that there is more to the 
interpretive processes that underlie verbal comprehension than general mind-reading 
abilities of the type evoked by Grice. Their proposal is that the processes that underlie 
verbal comprehension might be performed by a domain-specific ‗comprehension‘ 
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mechanism or module (SPERBER, 1994b, 2000).
2
 The function of such a mechanism 
would be to interpret ostensive stimuli using the relevance-based comprehension 
procedure. They justify this conclusion on the following lines. Firstly, the types of 
‗meaning‘ that a speaker can convey by producing an utterance are generally much 
more complex than the types of intention normally attributed to someone in order to 
explain their observed behaviour. Specialised mechanisms for the interpretation of 
speakers‘ meanings appear therefore to be necessary. Secondly and relatedly, we often 
attribute intentions to others by observing the effects of their actions, deciding which of 
those effects they might have desired, and attributing to them the intention to achieve 
those desired effects: for example, observing someone climb a tree and pick an apricot, 
we may infer that his intention in climbing the tree was to pick an apricot. However, a 
speaker will achieve very few effects by producing an utterance unless she is first 
understood, so the normal procedures for recognising the intentions behind ordinary 
non-communicative actions won‘t work: the hearer can‘t first observe the effect of an 
utterance and then infer what it meant. Third, on broadly Gricean accounts of 
communication, in order to understand intentional communication, as opposed to 
ordinary non-communicative behaviour, it is necessary to be able to attribute several 
layers of metarepresentations; yet young children below the age of 4—the same children 
who (as do autistic subjects) fail standard mind-reading tests—master verbal 
communication quickly and effortlessly well before this age. Moreover, they acquire 
words effortlessly too. 
A fully developed mindreading ability, or ‗first-order‘ theory of mind, is often 
equated with ability to pass a first-order version of the false-belief test (see BARON-
COHEN, 1995; SCHOLL; LESLIE, 1999). In this test, a child and an experimenter 
watch while an object is placed in a certain location. The experimenter then leaves the 
room and the object is moved to a new location (now unknown to the experimenter). 
When the experimenter returns to the room, the child is asked where she will look for 
the object. If the child can attribute a belief to the experimenter about the location of the 
object which differs from the belief she herself holds (i.e. one that is false), she will say 
that the experimenter will look in the wrong place. This presents a problem for an 
account that claims that general mind-reading abilities are put to use in word learning 
(which is under way well before children can pass the false-belief task). Why, when 
they acquire words so successfully, do children fail the false-belief task? 
One answer would be to suggest that the false-belief task is testing for something 
more complex than the ability to attribute mental states (see BLOOM; GERMAN 
2000). There is a growing literature on the question of how it is that children can be 
adept interpreters of utterances before they can read minds (in the sense of pass regular 
false-belief tasks), and a variety of different camps are emerging. In the first camp, there 
are those (TOMASELLO; BARTON, 1994; AKHTAR; CARPENTER; TOMASELLO, 
1996; HAPPÉ, LOTH, 2002) who warn against underestimating the inferential abilities 
of young children. In another there are those (RECANATI, 2002; BREHENY, 2006) 
who claim that we overestimate the degree to which the inferential attribution of 
intentions is a prerequisite to verbal communication. Research over the past ten years 
                                                 
2
 I use the term ‗module‘ in the sense of Sperber (1994b) and, indeed, much of the literature on 
evolutionary psychology: that is, in a somewhat ‗looser‘ sense than the one originally proposed by Fodor 
(1983). 
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puts an interesting new slant on the debate. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) suggest that 
on the basis of results from a new experimental paradigm, children as young as 15 
months can pass a non-verbal variant of the false-belief task. Southgate, Chevallier and 
Csibra (2010) demonstrate that 17-month-old children appeal to false beliefs in order to 
understand the referential intentions of others. 
Another solution would be to propose that word learning is facilitated by the same 
comprehension module that is responsible for intentional communication. This module 
is capable of generating complex, multi-layered metarepresentations specifically in 
communicative situations. Happé and Loth (2002) provide experimental evidence that 
supports this claim. They show that young children below the age of 4, who regularly 
fail basic first order theory of mind tests, are able to track false beliefs if the task is 
adapted so that it becomes a word-learning task. Akhtar (2002) provides experimental 
evidence suggesting that expectations of relevance play a role in lexical acquisition, and 
in particular that children‘s hypotheses about word meaning seem to be produced by 
following a path of least effort, as described in the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure. There is evidence from pathology too. Individuals with Asperger‘s 
Syndrome—an autism-related condition (FRITH, 1991)—show typically impaired 
mind-reading abilities, but ‗normal‘ language acquisition. Again this suggests a degree 
of dissociation between the mind-reading skills underlying social interaction, which 
autistic individuals and people with Asperger‘s Syndrome find hugely problematic, and 
those underlying language acquisition. 
In contrast to Bloom‘s proposal that autistic individuals bring simple associative 
mechanisms to bear on the word-learning process, the relevance-theoretic position 
suggested by Sperber (2004) is that they, just like normal children, are using the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and following a path of least effort, but on 
the basis of impoverished input caused by their inability to interpret ‗natural pragmatic‘ 
clues such as gaze direction, pointing, facial expressions, etc. More generally, autistic 
individuals typically use the least sophisticated of three interpretive strategies proposed 
by Sperber (1994a). When they can find the right interpretation by following a path of 
least effort and accepting the first interpretation that they find relevant enough (‗Naive 
Optimism‘), comprehension will succeed. However, they will fail in cases requiring 
more sophisticated strategies: for example, where the speaker is mistaken about what 
they will find relevant enough (‗Cautious Optimism‘), or is engaged in some forms of 
deceit (‗Sophisticated Understanding‘) (see SPERBER, 1994a; WILSON, 2000). By 
contrast, normal children become capable of Cautious Optimism (and hence of 
adjusting their interpretations to take account of the speaker‘s mistaken beliefs) at 
around the same time as they pass standard first-order belief tests.  
 
3.2 COMPREHENSION AND MINDREADING 
 
The basic proposal I want to make is this: since understanding utterances is as a 
matter of working out the intentions behind them, the skills implicated in the way adult 
speakers use and understand them are the same skills that Bloom sees as crucial to the 
way children acquire the meanings of words. Just as children are required to attribute 
intentions and interpret natural cues in order to acquire word meanings, so adult hearers 
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must do so in order to interpret successfully the words they hear. Indeed, the way 
children acquire words may provide them with clues as to how they are used. 
One similarity between relevance theory and Grice‘s pragmatic framework is that 
both distinguish (in different ways, and using different terminology) between the 
explicit and the implicit content of an utterance. The relevance-theoretic distinction 
between explicatures and implicatures bears some similarity to Grice‘s distinction 
between saying and implicating. However, the two pairs of notions are certainly not 
identical (see CARSTON, 2002). In Grice‘s framework, pragmatic inference contributes 
mainly to implicatures. In relevance theory, explicatures are recovered via a mixture of 
linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference, and are also a matter of degree: the greater 
the degree of linguistic encoding, the more explicit the explicitly communicated content 
of the utterance. 
A second difference between Gricean pragmatics and relevance theory, and a 
central claim of relevance-theoretic pragmatics, is that explicatures and implicatures are 
developed in parallel, with the explicit content being adjusted or ‗fine-tuned‘ in various 
ways in order to yield the implicatures required to satisfy the audience‘s expectations of 
relevance. In particular, encoded lexical meanings may have to be narrowed or loosened 
(assigned a narrower or broader denotation) in order to yield the expected level of 
implicatures (CARSTON, 1997, 2002; SPERBER; WILSON, 1998; WILSON, 
SPERBER 2002). Just as natural cues play a central role in lexical acquisition, so they 
also play a role in lexical pragmatics, the adjustment of encoded conceptual content. 
Crucial to lexical pragmatics is the observation that there is an interaction between 
decoding and inference not only the level of what is explicitly communicated by a 
whole sentence, but at word level too: a particular word may be used to express not 
exactly the concept it encodes, but a broader or narrower concept whose construction is 
constrained by pragmatic principles (CARSTON, 2010; WILSON; CARSTON, 2007). 
In these cases, the hearer constructs an ad hoc concept guided by considerations of 
relevance (for more on the nature of ad hoc concepts, see ALLOTT; TEXTOR, 2012). 
This kind of adjustment of conceptual content is seen as one of the principal processes 
in explicit communication. Consider the word ‗bear‘, the meaning of which might be 
narrowed in (1) to denote a sub-set of bears (e.g. polar bears), or loosened in (2) to 
include objects which are not strictly bears at all (e.g. large human beings): 
 
(1) A bear walked out across the frozen sea. 
(2) Chris was huge: he was a bear. 
 
Indeed, the same cues that children use in the acquisition of words play a regular 
role in adult comprehension. Indeed, the interpretation of natural communicative 
phenomena feeds directly into the lexical adjustment process. Consider examples (3), 
(4) and (5) below: 
 
(3) Jack: Shall we sit out here? 
     Lily (shivering ostensively): I‘m cold. 
(4) Lily (furiously): That makes me angry!  
(5) Lily (smiling broadly): I feel happy. 
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In (3), Lily and Jack meet outside a café. Lily‘s ostensive shiver accompanying 
her utterance of ‗I‘m cold‘ should be picked up by the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension procedure and used in interpreting the degree term ‗cold‘. The nature of 
the shiver will be treated as commensurate with the degree of coldness she feels, and, in 
effect, will calibrate the degree of coldness Jack understands her to feel and to be 
expressing as part of her meaning. The fact that Lily has shivered ostensively motivates 
Jack‘s search for the ‗extra‘ meaning Lily intends to convey. Clearly in this case, 
implicatures may depend on it; thus, Jack might be entitled to infer that Lily is 
definitely cold enough to want to go inside. In a parallel example, Lily‘s ostensive 
shiver accompanying her utterance of ‗It‘s lovely out here on the terrace, isn‘t it?‘ might 
provide Jack with a clue that she is being ironic, that actually she hates it on the terrace 
and that she would prefer to go inside. In both cases, shown natural behaviours feed into 
the interpretive process, guiding the hearer to a certain range or type of conclusions. 
Notice, too, that the natural behaviours produced by Lily not only help Jack 
establish the implicit content of her utterance, but also contribute to the proposition he 
takes her to be expressing (or the basic-level explicature of her utterance). The truth 
conditions of her utterance of ‗I‘m cold‘—and the truth-conditions of (4) and (5), which 
also contain degree terms—will vary according to the type or degree of ‗coldness‘ (or 
‗anger‘ or ‗happiness‘) she intends to communicate, and hence reflects in her natural 
behaviour (WHARTON, 2009; WILSON, CARSTON, 2007). 
What Lily linguistically encodes by using the word ‗angry‘, for example, is some 
quite general concept, which encompasses a considerable range of degrees and types of 
anger that may have to be narrowed during the comprehension process in order to 
satisfy Jack‘s expectations of relevance. The linguistically encoded content is calibrated 
by Lily‘s furious tone of voice and enriched by Jack to a concept—ANGRY*—that he 
takes to be commensurate with the degree and type of anger Lily intends to convey. 
What she encodes by the use of the word ‗happy‘ is also a quite general concept; again 
the occasion-specific sense is calibrated by reference to Lily‘s natural behaviours—in 
this example by features of her tone of voice and smile. 
For autistic individuals, rather than providing important clues to the speaker‘s 
intended meaning, these subtle variations in pitch, and constantly shifting facial 
expressions, are nothing more than an irritating distraction. (See McCANN; PEPPÉ for 
a comprehensive review of interpretation of vocal cues by people with autism.) 
Consider the following, taken from the writings of Donna Williams, an author with 
autism: 
 
Speak to me through my words,‘ I asked Dr. Marek. I wanted to cut down the struggle in 
putting mental pictures into words. ‗Can you take the dancing out of your voice and not 
pull faces so you don‘t distract me from what you‘re saying (WILLIAMS, 1994, p. 95)  
 
The ‗natural‘ side of communication, then, remains totally alien, and this affects 
not only their regular interpretation of utterances such as (3)-(5) but also their lexical 
acquisition. (See McCANN; PEPPE, 2003 for an overview of the problems autistic 
people have interpreting prosody, and CHEVALLIER et al, 2010 for a slightly different 
view.) 
 
 WHARTON, Tim. What words mean is a matter of what people mean by them. Linguagem em (Dis)curso – 
LemD, Tubarão, SC, v. 14, n. 3, p. 473-488, set./dez. 2014. 
P
ág
in
a4
8
2
 
4. NATURAL PRAGMATICS AND THE SHOWING-MEANINGNN CONTINUUM 
 
When I speak of ‗natural‘ communicative phenomena, I have in mind phenomena 
that mean naturally (GRICE, 1957). In Grice‘s terms, ‗means naturally‘ is roughly 
synonymous with ‗naturally indicates‘, so in the same way that black clouds might be 
said to mean rain or smoke to mean fire, Lily‘s smile might be said to mean she is 
happy, or Jack‘s frown mean he is displeased. This can be contrasted with the kind of 
meaning inherent in language (often referred to as ‗arbitrary‘ or ‗conventional‘), which 
Grice called non-natural; so the word pluie means ‗rain‘; Lily está feliz means ‗Lily is 
happy‘, or ―what that remark meant was ‗Jack is displeased‘‖. 
 In Wharton (2009), I propose that behaviours which carry natural meaning in 
Grice‘s sense fall into two classes. The distinction is based on the ethological distinction 
between signals and signs made in Hauser (1996, p. 9-10). In the first class there are 
those natural behaviours that have a signalling function:
3
 the reason that these 
behaviours have propagated in our species is that they convey information to others 
about an individual‘s mental state (van HOOFF, 1972; FRIDLUND, 1994; EKMAN 
1999). In the class of signals I include smiles and other facial expressions: ‗These 
expressions have been selected and refined over the course of evolution for their role in 
social communication‘ (EKMAN, 1999, p. 51). 
In the second class there are phenomena that carry natural meaning but do not 
have a signalling function: signs. In the class of signs I include, for example, shivering 
and bruises. Consider gaze direction as another example. The fact that someone‘s gaze 
is directed to a particular object lets others know what he is seeing; however, this is not 
its function but merely a by-product of the way the human visual system works.
 4
 
Although signs do not have a communicative function—in the sense that that is 
not the reason they have propagated in our species—they can be put to use in intentional 
communication. Indeed, all these natural behaviours, whether they are signs or signals, 
may be deliberately shown to an audience to provide evidence of an intention to inform. 
Relevance theorists (SPERBER; WILSON, 1986/95, p. 53; WHARTON, 2009) 
have argued that there is a continuum of cases between (indirect) cases of Gricean 
meaningNN and cases of ‗showing‘, where the evidence provided for the first layer is 
relatively direct. This idea that there is a continuum of cases has implications for the 
domain of pragmatic principles or maxims, for it suggests that they are best seen as 
applying to the domain of intentional communication as a whole, rather than to the 
domain of meaningNN, as is generally assumed in Gricean accounts. 
Among other things, the idea that there is a continuum of cases allows us to 
accommodate natural communicative behaviours within a pragmatic theory. The 
‗showing-meaningNN‘ continuum provides a snapshot of the types of evidence used in 
                                                 
3
 For discussion of various senses of the word ‗function‘ see SPERBER (2007). 
4
 As Hannes Rakoczy (p.c.) once suggested to me, there are other factors to bear in mind and—in the case 
of gaze direction—the situation is perhaps more complex than this. The upper part of the human face (and 
the human eye) has evolved in such a way that gaze direction is more easily identified (i.e. the ‗whites‘ of 
a person‘s eyes enable another to infer where that person looking, the region around the eye has evolved 
in such a way as to make the eye itself clearly visible). Notwithstanding this, I still maintain it is not the 
function of the direction of gaze itself to signal where an individual is looking. 
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intentional communicative acts. Such acts are typically a composite of inter-related 
behaviours falling at various points along the continuum. At one extreme of the 
continuum lie clear cases of spontaneous, natural display; at the other extreme lie clear 
cases of linguistic coding, where all the evidence provided for the first, basic layer of 
information is indirect. In between lie a range of cases in which more or less direct 
‗natural‘ evidence and more or less indirect coded evidence mix to various degrees 
(natural signals, for example). Gussenhoven and Chen (2000), Gussenhoven (2002) 
propose that the ‗meaning‘ inherent in intonation may be either arbitrary or based on 
universal ‗biological codes‘. In the framework proposed here, intonation (indeed, 
prosodic elements generally) would occupy various positions along the continuum (see 
WILSON; WHARTON, 2006; WHARTON, 2009, forthcoming, for further discussion). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
It seems clear that there is more to word learning than simple associationism, and 
that the attribution of mental states plays a crucial role in lexical acquisition. This paper 
has proposed, however, that just as there is more to human communication than general 
mind-reading abilities, so there is more to lexical acquisition than these abilities. 
Instead, lexical acquisition, in both normal and autistic children, is best viewed as an 
exercise of the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, governed by a dedicated 
module, which forms a sub-module of the wider mind-reading ability. Both normal and 
autistic children use this comprehension procedure, but autistic children have 
impoverished access to clues because of their independently well-attested inability to 
interpret gaze direction, pointing, emotional expressions, tone of voice, etc., as well as 
their general inability to think about what the speaker might have meant if their first-
pass interpretation goes wrong. Chevallier et al. 2011 argue that a lack of social 
motivation may also be a factor. 
 As far as cognitive architecture goes, the picture that emerges is a complex one, 
in which rather than comprising one general mechanism, the human ‗mind-reading‘ 
ability might be better characterised as involving a whole range of individual sub-
modules, each interacting with natural coding-decoding mechanisms. Baron Cohen‘s 
(1995) proposal is that theory of mind is comprised of (at least) four mechanisms, each 
of which is subject to breakdown. In the case of autism, his hypothesis is that autistic 
individuals exhibit a deficit in the Shared Attention Mechanism, which in turn disrupts 
the development of the Theory of Mind Mechanism. This, it is claimed, is the 
mechanism underlying the ability to attribute complex epistemic mental states (or 
propositional attitudes) such as ‗believe‘ and ‗think‘: the mental states typically lacking 
in autistic individuals. 
 In Wharton 2009, I suggest that the fact that some natural cues are signals would 
predict that they too are interpreted by specialised, perhaps dedicated, neural machinery. 
This prediction appears to be borne out. Both non-human primates and humans have 
neural mechanisms dedicated to both recognising faces and processing facial 
expressions (GAZZANIGA; SMILEY, 1991). Baron-Cohen, Spitz and Cross (1993) 
examined the recognition of emotion in autistic children in more detail. Based on the 
observation that autistic individuals have problems in recognising beliefs, they 
speculated about the extent to which this would manifest itself in the recognition of 
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‗cognitive‘ emotions. These are emotions such as surprise, which, since they are caused 
by beliefs, presume some sort of understanding of beliefs. Baron-Cohen et al. regard 
these as distinct from ‗simple‘ emotions—those emotions (such as happiness and 
sadness) caused by situations. As predicted, the autistic children had more difficulty 
recognising surprise (though see CHEVALLIER et al., 2011 for a different view). To 
the extent that these findings (and the suppositions on which they are based) are correct, 
it might be taken to suggest that while the meta-communicative and meta-psychological 
abilities in these subjects are impaired, certain of the mechanisms that decode signals 
remain intact. In current paradigms, lexical acquisition experiments do not recognise the 
sign-signal distinction, and potentially interesting questions are overlooked. Can the 
ability to interpret natural signals be impaired independently of other parts of the mind-
reading ability?  
 Lexical acquisition experiments also do not recognise the distinction between 
ostensive and non-ostensive use of natural cues. Notice that in these experiments gaze 
direction is not (or at least not always) used ostensively in the way it is in the example 
in §4. As we have seen, though, children are disposed from a very early age to monitor 
gaze direction (indeed, may have a sub-module dedicated to it), and since the fact that 
the adult is uttering words to the child is good evidence that he/she is communicating, 
the child‘s comprehension module (which presumably is not immune to false positives 
anyway) is activated. Happé and Loth (2002, p. 31) suggest that it would be interesting 
to monitor brain activity during observation of ostensive and non-ostensive acts in 
mental attribution tasks. It would also be informative to see whether the fact that a 
natural cue is used ostensively or non-ostensively would make any difference in a word-
learning task. 
And finally, there seems to be a parallel worth exploring: given (a) that the gap 
that exists between the concept encoded by a word and the concept communicated by 
occasion-specific uses of that word; (b) that words are rarely used to convey their exact 
literal meaning; (c) that the way children acquire words might provide them with clues 
as to how they are used, and (d) that there are arguments to suggest that the specifically 
pragmatic ‗comprehension‘ module may be implicated lexical acquisition as well as 
lexical pragmatics, it might at least be interesting to consider the extent to which 
understanding words (in normal adult comprehension) might be said to be a matter of 
acquiring new (in the sense of fine-grained, subtly nuanced and modulated by natural 
pragmatic factors) word meanings. After all, for children and adults alike, what words 
mean is a matter of what people mean by them. 
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capacidade especificamente pragmática. Presta-se especial atenção ao papel que os 
fenômenos comunicativos naturais – direção do olhar, expressão facial, tom de voz, etc. – 
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sugerirei, em função das recentes investigações em pragmática lexical fundamentada na 
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